How things change. In 1989, when David Fromkin published A
Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the
Modern Middle East (Henry Holt), I couldn't have been less interested. I
dimly recall the title, but I never handled the book or heard of anybody reading
it. So I'd probably have gone on obliviously if it hadn't been for
Amazon's practice of bundling related books. You don't save anything by buying
these bundles (Amazon's prices are already fairly discounted), but you do make
discoveries. As it happened, I recently wanted to buy a friend a paperback copy
of Margaret Macmillan's Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World,
and there it was, Mr Fromkin's book, as a suggested companion purchase, and I
couldn't have been more interested. I bought the bundle at once.
It won't do any good, but I'll declare at the outset that this
book is required reading for all Americans. That's the bullying sort of remark
that I try never to make, but my sense of avertable tragedy has overwhelmed my
manners. It is impossible to read End All Peace without being conscious,
on almost every page, of the folly of the American misadventure in Iraq; it is
also impossible not to hope that, if more people knew that the modern Middle
East was fashioned in another, kindred folly of good intentions and fond
conceit, then the misadventure might more quickly be brought to a close.
Finally, there is the Cassandra touch, of having learned from a book that it
might have been read before it was too late.
A Peace to End All Peace appeared, as I say, in 1989, before the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Lebanon and Afghanistan were at war, but the first
attack on the World Trade Center lay in the future, and the impending
dissolution of the Soviet Empire had everybody's attention. Fatefully, the Cold
War, which in retrospect provided the gravity that kept global stability in
place, was about to come to an end, with sorrowful consequences for many people
- Bosnians, certainly - and a a reassessment of alliances all round. Yet much
that has happened since 1989 could have been foretold by the assiduous reader of
this book.
I have only one complaint to make, and that is about the
subtitle, which ought to have read, The British Undoing of the Ottoman
Empire. Mr Fromkin writes in his introduction,
As you will see when you read the book, Middle Eastern
personalities, circumstances and political cultures do not figure a great deal
in the narrative that follows, except when I suggest the outlines and dimensions
of what European politicians were ignoring when they made their decisions.
It would have more accurate to substitute "British" for
European here. End All Peace is overwhelming concerned with British
politicians, civil servants, military officers, and journalists. From it one
might construct the beginnings of a catalogue raisonnée of that key
diplomatic documents, from treaties to diary entries, that between 1914 and 1922
shaped a Middle Eastern order out of the dust of the Ottoman Empire, and most of
these were British. The narrative is propelled by an inner tension that Mr
Fromkin says he only discovered in the course of writing it. First, there was
the story that he always meant to tell. This story centered on Sir Mark Sykes, a
wealthy baronet and amateur diplomat who championed the arrangement that was
eventually put into place in 1922, four years after Sykes's death of influenza.
By itself, this story would be a straightforward account of the thinking behind
the line-drawing and power-sharing that disposed of the non-Turkish regions of
the Ottoman Empire. The second story was implicit, and I daresay had to be
teased out by Mr Fromkin. The second story was about growing British resistance
to the first story. Mr Fromkin's conclusion appears near the end, and the
italics are his.
It was no wonder, then, that in the years to come British
officials were to govern the Middle East with no great sense of direction or
conviction. It was a consequence of a peculiarity of the settlement of 1922:
having destroyed the old order in the region, and having deployed troops,
armored cars, and military aircraft everywhere from Egypt to Iraq, British
policy-makers imposed a settlement upon the Middle East in 1922 in which, for
the most part, they themselves no longer believed.
We tend to think of World War I as a morass of trenches and
corpse-ridden no-man's-land. It was certainly that, but on the other side of
Europe there was another war, in which the Entente powers fought the Ottoman
Empire, which had sided with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Where the Western
Front was a stalemate, however, the Middle Eastern front was a veritable pinball
game of hits and misses, contingencies that could easily have worked out
otherwise. To begin with, the Turks courted an English alliance in 1911 but was
rebuffed. Thereafter, it sought a German alliance, but again without success -
until the very eve of war, 2 August 1914. Two days later, Britain seized the two
dreadnoughts that had been built for and paid for by Turkey; presently, two
German warships that had skirted British naval incompetence in the Mediterranean
would be "refitted" as Turkish ships, "purchased" to take the place of the
dreadnoughts. No one was clearly informed of anyone's acts or motivations, and
misinterpretation abounded on all sides. It is only by snaking through the
feints and bluffs, however, that one gets from the outbreak of war to the
creation of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq - all fashioned
from the Ottoman Empire, and fashioned according to commitments made during the
war for reasons that had in many cases vanished by the war's end. To give but
one example, part of the motivation behind the Balfour Declaration - the
statement of British sympathy with the "idea" of a Jewish homeland - was a hope
that Russian Jews would be galvanized into continuing the war, although by
November 1917, when Balfour addressed his celebrated letter to Lord Rothschild,
it was already too late for that. Almost without exception, British military men
stationed in the Middle East, moreover, were both sympathetic to Arabs (whom
they did not, however, believe capable of self-government) and hostile to
Zionists. Nor did the document have the support of all of Britain's leading
Jews. The British were prepared to muddle through somehow, but their every
gesture seems to have made peace in the Middle East an ever more distant
prospect.
It would be hard to say that Mr Fromkin is sympathetic to the
British statesmen and officers who, while usually meaning well, suffered
terribly blinkered vision. The only clear-sighted man in the bunch was
Churchill, but his impatient swagger simply fueled passive aggression all round,
with the result that it was Churchill who was blamed for the disastrous
Gallipoli campaign, even though it never would have occurred if his directives
had been executed by the Navy. Indeed, Churchill was the only Englishman with
any real fighting courage. Even Kitchener, the hero of Khartoum and head of the
war effort, was a worrier who could not directly relate to the Cabinet, but
could only communicate through underlings. The most serious British blunder,
repeated again and again, was the assumption that Arabs would rather be ruled by
fair and honest Britain than by corrupt and inert Turks. Nor did the British
recognize, in Mustafa Kemal, a Westernizer who would transform Turkey itself.
Indeed, that oversight may be forgiven; Kemal, better know now as Atatürk, was
the only one of the charismatic nationalists to emerge from World War I who
would leave his people better off than he found them. It is lucky that Kemal
took Churchill's bluff seriously in 1922, and backed down from the imminence of
a new war, over the occupation of Istanbul. But the crisis brought Lloyd
George's coalition to an end, and, unlike Churchill, Lloyd George would never
taste power again.
The parade of arrogant cluelessness on parade in this book is
enormously distressing, because even though the War was over long ago, its
legacy persists.
Some of [today's] disputes, like those elsewhere in the world,
are about rulers or frontiers, but what is typical of the Middle East is that
more fundamental claims are also advanced, drawing into question not merely the
dimensions anbd the boundaries, but the right to exist, of countries that
immediately or eventually emerged from the British and French decisions of the
early 1920s: Iraq, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon. So at this point in the twentieth
century, the Middle East is the region of the world in which wars of national
survival are still being fought with some frequency.
If nothing else, Mr Fromkin's book will help readers make sense of Arab
"insurgency," and perhaps even explain the urgency of removing our
troops from a menace that their presence in the Middle East will only intensify. But how foolish I feel, exhorting visitors to pick up a book that's more than fifteen years old.